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REVIEW SECTION SYMPOSIUM
Feminist Jurisprudence

The Liberal Future of Relational
Feminism: RobinWest's Caring
for Justice
Linda C. McClain
Robin West. Caring for Justice. New York: New York University Press,
1997. Pp. 356.
Robin West is one of the most prolific1 and creative members of the
legal academy. Her distinctive voice, as expressed in several books and numerous scholarly articles, informs and shapes debates within such diverse
areas as constitutional theory (West 1990b; West 1994), feminist jurisprudence (West 1987; West 1988), and law and literature (West 1993). Indeed, some of her early articles concerning feminist jurisprudence (West
1987, West 1988) are now "classics" in a relatively new field of inquiry and
appear in virtually every anthology or textbook in the field (Bartlett and
Kennedy 1991, 201; Becker, Bowman, and Torrey 1994, 90; Fineman and
Thomadsen 1991, 115; Frug 1992, 807; Smith 1993, 493; Weisberg 1993,
75; Weisberg 1996, 162). Such articles continue to inspire a rich body of
both sympathetic and critical work by feminists and other scholars.
Linda C. McClain is professor of law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hofstra
University, Hempstead, New York. The author thanks Robin West for constructive
conversations about this essay as well as Sherry Colb, Howard Erlanger, Jim Fleming, Sally
Goldfarb, Julie Goldscheid, Tracy Higgins, Carlin Meyer, and Denise Morgan for helpful
comments and Heather A. Cowie and Connie Lenz for valuable research assistance.
1. E.g., a recent survey published by the Chicago-Kent Law Review listed West among the
most prolific law professors (number 15) and observed that she was the only woman among
the top 25 (Lindgren and Seltzer 1996, 804). Although certain features of the survey make it
questionable as an accurate reflection of "productivity," i.e., it does not include books and
counts only scholarly articles published in the "top" 20 law reviews (determined on the basis
of frequency of citation), it nonetheless provides some indication of West's prominence in the
legal academy.
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West's scholarly work characteristically organizes bodies of legal
thought into large, dichotomous categories and identifies the salient features and serious limitations of such thought. Two pervasive and central
focal points in her categorizing are differences between women's and men's
lives and experiences and differences between feminist thought and liberal
thought or, as she often terms it, liberal legalism. West's widely discussed
article "Jurisprudence and Gender" (1988) identified categorical and "essential" differences between women and men, rooted not only in culture but
also in their material, or biological, experiences. Men, she argued, are fundamentally separate selves, while women (due to such experiences as pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding) are "essentially connected" to other
human life (West 1988, 3). She made the grand and categorical claim that
"all of modem legal theory" (including liberalism as well as critical legal
studies) is "essentially and irretrievably masculine" in its model of selfhood
and that, as a consequence, law fails to reflect women's lives and experiences and to recognize and protect women against the distinctive harms
that they suffer (West 1988, 2, 60).
In contrast b such masculinist modes of understanding the world,
West identifies the centrality of relationships and connection as a unifying
theme in both "cultural" (or "relational") feminist thought and radical feminist thought; the former, she observes, emphasizes the positive aspects of
such connections and the latter, which places sex inequality and women's
subordination to men at the core of women's lives, underscores the harmful
aspects of it (West 1988, 28-30). Following up on a project begun in her
article "The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives" (1987, 142), West
called in "Jurisprudence and Gender" for a "hedonic" jurisprudence that focused on the distinctive nature of women's pleasures and pains as a first step
toward a "reconstructive" or "humanist jurisprudence," which would reflect
the experiences of both women and men and bring about a legal system that
afforded adequate protection to both women and men (West 1988, 70-72).
West has suggested that, unlike masculinist thought's obsession with rights,
justice, and autonomy, such a jurisprudence would give a proper, if not a
primary, place to responsibility, care, and relationships, thus better reflecting women's moral lives and concerns (West 1988, 37; 19 89a; 1989b).
These articles established West as one of the most prominent proponents of relational, or "difference," feminism. Such feminist thought focuses
not only on biological differences between women and men but also, largely
inspired by Carol Gilligan's pathbreaking work in moral psychology (Gilligan 1982), on differences in their moral reasoning and fundamental orientations toward the world (Minow 1990). Difference feminists' claims
launched a rich and sustained internal debate among feminist legal scholars
over the promise and peril of the "different voice" and the "ethic of care" as
against the "ethic of justice" (Marcus and Spiegelman 1985; McClain 1992)
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and over "essentialism." The latter is said to posit essential, or unifying and
common, characteristics about the category "women," to take the experience of some women as representative of all women, and to ignore the import of salient and constitutive differences among women (Harris 1990;
Cain 1990).2
Where do matters stand? Appearing one decade after her diagnosis of
the gap between women's lives and law and her call for a humanist jurisprudence, West's new book, Caring for Justice, provides a fruitful occasion for
assessing the current state of relational feminism and the progress made thus
far in the quest for such a jurisprudence. By smoothing over the common
dichotomy in relational feminist thought between care and justice, the
book's title bespeaks a reconciliatory effort. Indeed, the book jacket's endorsements praise West for "mapping the connections of justice and care to
each other" and making "an especially powerful case for transcending the
3
dichotomy between 'care' and 'justice."'
Beginning with the basic assertion that connection can be a source of
both pleasure and pain in people's (especially women's) lives, West's thesis
is that legal and political institutions fail both "to protect and nurture the
connections that sustain and enlarge us" and "to intervene in those private
and intimate 'connections' that damage and injure us" (p. 14). Caring for
Justice pursues this thesis along three different avenues, roughly corresponding to the book's structure. First, West argues for a model of judging and of
legal argument that gives both justice and care their due and maintains that
the "zealous" pursuit of either one in the absence of the other will fail as a
matter of both justice and of care. Second, examining women's lives
through a twofold focus on pleasure and pain, West places at the center of
such lives "gender-specific harms" or "gendered harms" (pp. 97-98) and indicts law and legal theory not only for failing to recognize or ameliorate
these harms but also for being complicit in legitimating and perpetuating
them. She advocates an "instrumentalist" feminist jurisprudence that would
restore the concept of harm to a central place in jurisprudence by regarding
law fundamentally as an instrument "designed to minimize the harms we
suffer in social life" and would use'law to advance the goal of creating a
legal world in which the harms women suffer are taken as seriously as the
harms suffered by men (pp. 94-95, 174-78). Neither "liberal nor conservative legalism," she contends, holds out a credible alternative to an instru2. Feminist legal scholars advancing the anti-essentialist critique draw on other feminist
work critiquing essentialism (Spelman 1988, hooks 1984). Anti-essentialists also have challenged the sweeping and categorical claims of Catharine MacKinnon's dominance feminism,
insofar as those claims concerning the formative effects of male domination and systemic
patriarchy upon the construction of women's identity appear to equate women's identity with
victimhood (Harris 1990; MacKinnon 1987, 1989).
3. The first quote is from an endorsement by Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a law professor at
UCLA Law School and Georgetown University Law Center; the second is from Cass Sunstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago.
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mentalist jurisprudence (p. 173). Third, West explores the turn within the
legal academy to literature and proposes that lawyers and legal scholars read
literature for insights about the presence of gendered injuries and how law
and society do not simply ignore but actually legitimate such injuries by
casting women and other marginalized groups as "invisible" or "legitimate"
victims (pp. 218-19). Caring for Justice also includes a comparison of feminism and postmodernism and a critique of the latter in light of the concerns
of the former (pp. 259-92). The book's chapters on adjudication and on the
concept of harm reflect mostly new and previously unpublished material,
while the chapters on law and literature and postmodernism reproduce, with
some revisions, previously published work.
In this review essay, I focus primarily on the first two of West's three
projects, both because they represent her newest work and because they are,
to my mind, the most creative and constructive contributions of the book. I
contend that Caringfor Justice points to the liberal future of relational feminism and that key liberal concepts and principles supply crucial ingredients
in West's critical and reconstructive work of diagnosing the harms that
4
women suffer and advancing a normative account of what women need.
This thesis may seem surprising, given West's critical stance toward "liberal
legalism" in the present book and previous work. I shall make good on it by
illustrating how her internal critique of the ethic of care (or the problem of
care without justice), as well as her "integrated" argument for reproductive
freedom, rely on a fundamentally liberal model of self (which I shall call the
"choosing, caring self") and key liberal ideas, such as autonomy (the capacity to form and act on a conception of the good), self-respect, integrity, and
the equal moral worth of persons. This move in the direction of liberalism is
a significant, if complicated, development within relational feminism. It
harbors the potential to reinvigorate liberalism with a more explicit focus
on such core relational feminist concerns as care and connection.
My second thesis is that the future of relational feminism is liberal in
another important sense: over against certain postmodernist skepticism,
West believes that it is possible to talk about "women" as a meaningful
category and embraces a model of self in which autonomy is a meaningful
and valuable concept. Moreover, she has a commitment to, and some confidence about the prospects for, using law and politics to critique and revise
our institutional arrangements and social practices to improve people's lives,
or (to use a more liberal concept) to realize more fully an ideal of free and
equal citizenship. I share this belief and this commitment. However, West
appears to hold out hope for a true or undistorted self, unshaped by culture
or by power relationships within society. Ironically, she may quest for too
"liberal" a self even for most liberals!
4. The inspiration for this coinage is Zillah Eisenstein's book The Radical Future of Liberal
Feminism (1981).
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I suggest three problems with West's rich and evocative phenomenological account of women's lives, attention to which would make her instrumentalist jurisprudence more appealing. I substantiate that critique by
assessing her assertion that fear motivates many women's acts of sexual and
domestic altruism within marriage and turns women into self-sacrificing,
"giving selves." First, her sweeping and categorical claims about women appear not to engage adequately with the most cogent criticisms by anti-essentialist feminist scholars, who urge that theorizing about women be more
contextual, provisional, and nuanced (Bartlett 1990; Harris 1990). I suggest
that feminist analysis that is less categorical and more contextual and empirical would more usefully inform the important ongoing cultural and legal
debates about marriage and the family. Second, West treats both law and
culture as exerting uniform and almost crushing force on women's identity
and lives and fails to reckon with the complex relationship between self and
culture or with the ways women manifest the capacity for self-direction and
resistance (Abrams 1995; Higgins 1996; Schneider 1992). To avoid equating women's seifhood with victimhood or treating women as wholly determined by biology or culture, she needs a more dialectical model of the
interplay between self and culture; I suggest that West could find valuable
allies both in liberal notions of the capacity to revise ourselves and our
institutions and in postmodem feminist ideas of persons not only as shaped
by but also as shapers of the process of social construction (Rosenblum
1989; Hirschmann 1996).
The third problem is that West's analysis suffers from internal tension
over the relative importance of law, as distinct from culture, as a tool for
perpetuating (or legitimating) and ameliorating gender-based harm. At
times West indicts law as a potent force causing women to become giving
selves; at other times, she suggests that law is generally autonomous from
patriarchy and that it is culture that plays the more important role in perpetuating gendered harms. To use law as an instrument, as West urges, feminist reformers need a clearer picture of when law is a proper tool. A
promising future for a humanistic jurisprudence, which integrates care and
justice and takes seriously the harms suffered by women as well as men, may
lie in the creative melding of core components of liberalism, anti-essentialism, and postmodemism. In this sense the future of relational feminismand feminist jurisprudence itself-is in significant part liberal.

I.

LIBERALISM IS AN INDISPENSABLE INGREDIENT
IN WEST'S INTEGRATION OF JUSTICE AND CARE

In Caringfor Justice, West offers a sustained argument that an adequate
model of adjudication and legal argument must integrate justice and care
and that the "zealous" pursuit of one in isolation from the other leads to
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results that are neither caring nor just. She advances her argument through
exploring a series of dominant images of legal justice and care and seeming
oppositions between them (for example, justice as blindfolded versus care as
commitment to a particular other) (pp. 25-88). Here, I cannot do justice to
the full, rich range of West's images.5 Instead, I will focus on two features of
her treatment that suggest that liberal principles of autonomy, self-respect,
and equal moral worth play a crucial, yet insufficiently acknowledged, role
in her integrative efforts: first, West's critique of women's uncompensated
domestic labor as an example of the pursuit of care unconstrained by the
demands of justice, and second, her critique of liberal reproductive freedom
arguments as illustrating the failure of the pursuit of justice unconstrained
by the demands of an ethic of care.
A.

Care without Justice: From the "Giving Self" to the
"Choosing, Caring Self"

West creatively melds key claims of relational feminism and dominance (or radical) feminism to offer a hedonic analysis of women's lives,
experiences, and needs, and to show law's inadequacy to reflect such lives
and experiences and to meet those needs. Like many relational feminists,
she offers as emblematic of the good side of connection the mother-child
relationship; she also stresses girls' and women's close connections to female
relatives and friends (pp. 31, 135). Similar to dominance feminists such as
Catharine MacKinnon, she identifies heterosexuality as a source of many
bad forms of connection, most dramatically rape, sexual assault, and marriages in which violence and abuse are prevalent (p. 2; MacKinnon 1991).
She also indicts marriage as a relationship that seldom meets women's emotional and sexual needs and as an institution in which women sacrifice
themselves for the sake of spouse and children through disproportionately
performing domestic labor and child care, or "the second shift" (pp. 110-12;
Hochschild 1989). As I elaborate in part II, on West's interpretation, sexuality and heterosexual marriage are too often the site of the obliteration of
women's subjectivity and their reconstitution as "giving selves" who aim to
fulfill not their own desires or needs but the needs and desires of others,
namely, men and children.
West assesses many acts of "caring" as gender-based injuries because
they exemplify care unconstrained by justice: "Relationships of care, untempered by the demands of justice, resulting in the creation of injured,
harmed, exhausted, compromised, and self-loathing 'giving selves,' rather
than in genuinely compassionate and giving individuals, are ubiquitous in
5. West draws many images from literature and popular culture to illustrate aspects of
justice and care and to suggest opposition between them.
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this society, and it is far more often women than men who are injured by
them" (p. 81). Why women more than men? West offers two reasons. First,
female children, more than male children, are taught that self-sacrifice in
the domestic realm will receive parental and societal approval (p. 8 1). Second, the prevalence of sexual violence directed against women far more
than men leads women to manage the threat of such violence by becoming
"giving selves" in marriage, whereby they stave off fear of assault by other
men (p. 82).
By indicting care unconstrained by justice, West offers an internal critique of relational feminism to the extent that it does not critically investigate the context of and causes for women's disproportionate participation in
caretaking work. Here she seems to agree with criticisms that a number of
feminist scholars (including myself) have made of relational feminists' embrace of an ethic of care without careful attention to the possible origins of
care in women's subordination and to the problem of equating such care
with female self-sacrifice (MacKinnon 1987; McClain 1992; Rhode 1989).
West's internal critique also poses a vexing problem for relational feminism:
how is it possible to celebrate an ethic of care, prominently identified with
women's moral lives and nurturing practices, while diagnosing much (or
even most) of women's disproportionate involvement in caretaking activity
not as a moral virtue but as a gender-based harm? Her answer is: Interrogate whether such acts of care stem from genuinely caring motivations or
from "unjust" motivations rooted in gender socialization and gender
violence.
West proposes to distinguish virtue from harm by reference to a liberal
model of the self, notwithstanding her own ambivalence about such a
model. By liberal, I mean amodel of the self that regards persons as having
certain capacities, or moral powers, including the capacity to form, act
upon, and revise a conception of the good (Rawls 1996). Accordingly, liberalism gives prominent value to autonomy, understood as self-direction, and
espouses a principle of decisional sovereignty whereby the individual, rather
than government, is responsible for exercising choice concerning the most
significant matters in her life (Allen 1988; Dworkin 1993; Fleming 1995;
Macedo 1990). At the same time, some accounts of liberalism persuasively
argue for a governmental responsibility to foster moral capacity and responsible self-government (Raz 1986; Dworkin 1996; McClain 1998). Liberalism
also espouses the equal moral worth and dignity of persons (Dworkin 1977).
This model of the self, properly modified to take account of salient feminist
arguments about constraints on women's agency as well as the constitutive
role of social construction (Hirschmann 1996), undergirds the liberal feminism that I endorse (McClain 1998). West should more directly acknowledge the role that liberalism plays in her own feminist account.
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Repeatedly, West notes the gap between women's lives and a liberal
model of self. For example, she claims:
The many women and the occasional man who define themselves as
not-selves suffer a decreased sense of personal autonomy, of independence, of individuation, and of integrity. There is no reason to celebrate these stunted selves whose very existence is dramatic evidence of
massive social injustice, by misconstruing the selflessness they exemplify as the virtue of compassion. (p. 83)
Further, West describes the harm suffered by a woman who becomes a "giving self' in marriage to one man out of fear of sexual violence from other
men: such a woman has entered into a "joy-deadening pact of protection"
and traded away "in a sense, her right to bodily pleasure, full autonomy, and
sensual integrity" in exchange for a measure of safety (p. 82). Of the damage
caused by gender socialization that leads women to engage in self-sacrificing
acts of domestic altruism to gain approval, West states that "the self who
seeks approval is a self who must deny her own interests, ambitions,
projects, and independence" and that the performance of uncompensated
acts "with no recognition of the toll taken on one's own individuated life
projects" is an act of self-betrayal (p. 82). Finally, an abusive marriage damages "the abused partner's-usually the wife's-autonomy, sense of selfhood
and self-regard, competencies, and privacy, to say nothing of her safety and
physical integrity. [It] censors a woman's moral voice, as well as her selfregarding one" (p. 2). "Care" motivated by gender socialization and fear "is
not just because it is lacking in integrity as its true nature goes unacknowledged, and it is not caring because it is motivated by fear and desperate selfpreservation, not true friendship or compassion" (p. 83). In other words, it is
unjust that conditions that disproportionately threaten or affect women impel (or socialize) them to seek out these bargains, for this is the antithesis of
responsible self-government or self-determination.
At its core, the model of self in light of which West diagnoses gendered
harms is liberal and liberal feminist: women have a basic right to self-determination and development and exercise of their moral capacities, and they
suffer injury when their very conception of self denies them such self-government. A commitment to the equal moral worth of persons and a conception of equal concern and respect would condemn law's affording unequal
protection to women (for example, through the exemption of marital rape
from rape laws and shielding intimate violence from the law's purview)
(Mill 1869; Dworkin 1977; Rawls 1997). Liberal feminists share West's condemnation of a political and legal system that leaves women vulnerable to
"private" violence (West 1990a), for liberals view civil society as society
civilized by the state and posit the obligation of government to protect
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against private aggression as fundamental (Holmes 1995, 262; Williams
1998; McDonagh 1996).
Moreover, liberals and liberal feminists recognize that the presence of
unjust background conditions constraining certain persons' capacities to
form, act on, and revise a conception of the good cautions against simple
acceptance of those persons' desires and actions as reflecting the exercise of
their autonomy (Mill 1869; Grimshaw 1986; Sunstein 1996). Liberal feminists' internal critique of liberalism highlights that securing justice within
the family and eliminating the disproportionate burdening of women with
domestic labor that West condemns as a gendered harm should be proper
concerns of a liberal state (Okin 1989; 1994b; Rawls 1997). As I elaborate
elsewhere, there are difficult and unresolved questions for liberals and feminists over what government may or should do to address the problem of
"inner" or "internal" constraints on persons' capacities for self-government
(Hirschmann 1996; McClain 1998).6 Nonetheless, West's internal critique
of care without justice uses key liberal principles, just as a number of other
feminist legal scholars embrace such principles even as they aim to reformulate and redescribe them for feminist ends (Nedelsky 1989; Minow 1990;
Yuracko 1995). Such reformulation does not obliterate their liberal roots
(Ward 1995).
But West's is an integrative project, and it would be misleading to suggest that her integration of care and justice yields simply liberalism. She
criticizes liberalism for its seeming inattention to the centrality of connection in persons' lives, the barriers that bad forms of connection pose to
women's well-being, and the moral worth of good forms of connection. Liberal legalism, she claims, celebrates "a liberal subject who is at best a sociopathic caricature of the 'individual' celebrated by classical liberals" and
who is "liberated from all hierarchic impediments to his freely chosen life
projects, and pathologically disconnected from all moral entanglements
with others" (p. 5). Yet West also indicts the giving self as engaging in
"deeply immoral" forms of connection (p. 2), and she clearly shares liberalism's commitment to freeing persons from hierarchic impediments to their
responsible self-determination (West 1994).
If pathological disconnection is bad, and living for others out of fear is
also bad, what is the happy medium? Although West does not offer an
explicit account of her alternative model, the trajectory that she travels
seems to veer away from both the giving self, characteristic of care without
justice, and the separate self, unencumbered by care, and to lead to the
6. There is an interesting convergence between some recent liberal and feminist writing
on the need to use government to reshape social norms and people's preferences in order to
help them (particularly women, because of the social meaning of being a woman) to participate effectively in democratic and personal self-government (Higgins 1997; Raz 1986; Sunstein 1996). In other work, I advocate a liberal feminist approach that is not as overtly
perfectionist as some other approaches (McClain 1998).
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choosing, caring self (or the self who chooses to care). On such an integrated account, an adequate model of self begins with the fact of connection
as a descriptive account of our lives, but then holds as a normative principle
that connection is good and morally valuable only when we choose it from
legitimate motivations and not under unjust background conditions. This
pushes relational feminism in the direction of liberalism, just as it insists
that liberal thought take relational feminism seriously by positing a self for
whom separation and connection are constitutive. So interpreted, West's
integrative account may be a friendly emendation of liberalism. 7 Of course,
whether the choosing, caring self suffices as an integration of care and justice is another question, to which I turn in the context of assessing, in the
next section, West's critique of liberal arguments for reproductive freedom
and, in part II, her analysis of marriage.

B.

Justice without Care: The Example of Reproductive
Freedom

West uses the current landscape of reproductive freedom arguments to
illustrate the problem of the failure of the pursuit of justice unconstrained
by the demands of the ethic of care. Specifically, she critiques the insistence
on "institutional consistency"-similar treatment for those similarly situated-without "nurtrance"-a moral mandate implied by the ethic of care
and by the centrality in women's (and some men's) lives of nurturtant practices (pp. 27-28, 61-74).8 West contends that, although the Supreme Court
has not endorsed such an argument, "it has often been urged in liberal legal
scholarship that the right to an abortion follows from the mandate of justice, in part because it is necessary to render consistent, or equal, or the
same, the burdens of reproductive life for men and women" (p. 66). In effect, this liberal argument is that abortion rights render women and men
more similar with respect to the choice to undergo "the tremendously antiindividualistic and counterautonomous experience of pregnancy and
parenthood" (pp. 65-66).
West cites as her leading example of the consistency argument Judith
Jarvis Thomson's "seminal" article, "A Defense of Abortion" (p. 297;
Thomson 1971). Thomson poses the imaginative hypothetical scenario of
whether a woman who wakes up to find herself connected to a famous violinist (who must remain connected to her for nine months in order to stay
7. This interpretation seems sound, given that West sometimes writes as a sympathetic
or friendly critic of liberalism, seeking to improve and reconstruct it (West 1990b; 1997).
Conversations with West concerning the thesis of this essay confirm my interpretation of her
project.
8. West describes this ideal of consistency with the visual image of the "plumb-line test"
(p. 27).
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alive) may refuse that connection. Concluding that she may, Thomson argues that "no person is morally required to make large sacrifices to sustain
the life of another who has no right to demand them," that is, to be a Good
Samaritan (or a Very Good Samaritan) (Thomson 1971, 64). 9 The legal
argument is that the physical burdens of pregnancy require precisely such
sacrifices of women, so that if society does not uniformly impose samaritanism or nurturing burdens on citizens (e.g., requiring parents to donate organs to children), it violates principles of equal protection as well as liberty
to impose such burdens only on pregnant women (Regan 1979; Sunstein
1993; Tribe 1988, 1354-58; Law 1984). This argument for consistency (as
West puts it) justifies a right to abortion even in the face of claims about
fetal personhood and a "right to life." (The argument is strongest with respect to "involuntary" pregnancy [e.g., rape] and, to a lesser extent, contraceptive failure.)
This argument for consistency, West contends, has two "pernicious
consequences." First, it "privatizes" pregnancy by treating pregnancy and
motherhood as matters of choice; if motherhood is voluntary, then there is
no societal obligation to pregnant women or collective responsibility for the
nurture of new life. Second, an argument premised on women's and men's
equal right to "abandon" fetuses subordinates the experience, potential, and
value of extant fetal life to the demand of consistency. It runs roughshod
over the "moral mandate of nurturance that is implied by the ethic of care"
and assumes a moral stance toward dependent life that "unnecessarily renders a decision to abort as diametrically at odds with women and men's
nurturant practices," that is, "women do indeed nurture fetuses, and women
as well as men make huge sacrifices to nurture babies and young children"
(p. 67). Women's abortion decision making, West claims, is rarely premised
on an abstract insistence that we render consistent the nurturant obligations of men and women. Instead, studies of such decision making revealand "an increasing number of even liberal, as well as postmodem and radical arguments for abortion rights are beginning to acknowledge"-that "the
interests and value of the fetus, as well as the woman's connection to it,
decision to permust be taken into account if the decision to abort, or the
mit the woman the freedom to make the decision, is to be a just one" (p.
68).

9. Since Thomson's article, two notable recent books explore the question of the permissibility of abortion if the fetus has the moral standing of a person (Kamm 1992; McDonagh
1996). In Creation and Abortion (1992), Frances Kamm offers a rigorous philosophical examination of the moral permissibility of killing in abortion cases by drawing parallels to the
permissibility of killing in nonabortion cases. In Breaking the Abortion Deadlo&k (1996), Eileen
McDonagh recasts Thomson's basic argument in terms of a Captive Samaritan: the justification for abortion rests in a woman's right to refuse consent to a fetus's taking of her body,
given the state's obligation to protect persons from private aggression.
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What, then, is West's alternative argument? How would she avoid the
"pernicious consequenceg" of the consistency argument? She contends that
an argument that acknowledges the "constraints of an ethic of care" and
reconciles it with a decision to abort yields an argument that is stronger "as
a matter of justice and as a matter of care" (p. 72). West's argument proves
to be quite liberal indeed: It is unjust, she contends, for society to force
women into a caring relationship precisely because that caring relationship
has moral worth only when freely bestowed by women. Part of women's
positive liberty should be the "right to create materially secure, consensual,
and safe nurturant relationships" (p. 74). In effect, women have a right to
choose to become mothers or not, and society and law should respect their
choices. Here the central role played by a liberal principle of self-determination in West's analysis could hardly be more clear. She states: "the woman
who is pregnant against her will or desire nurtures the fetus altruistically,
but does so without having committed herself to the moral project"; such a
woman "nurtures, but without the preceding act of will and commitment
that would engage her moral, choosing self' (pp. 105-7). It is critical to
women's moral agency that they be free to choose whether to assume pregnancy's onerous burdens of nurture. In effect, she envisions a choosing, caring self.
West claims that her care-based argument is different from a liberal
argument, which she reductively characterizes in terms of the claim that
women should be free, like men, to "abandon dependent fetal life" or, in
effect, to have sex without consequences (p. 68). I disagree. This characterization is not true to liberal arguments. West's is a strongly liberal and feminist argument. Her claim that forced motherhood lacks moral worth and her
reference to the importance of a woman endorsing the "moral project" of
pregnancy and nurture resonate with liberal arguments that compelled
choices and actions do not improve people's lives but invade their autonomy and ruin their lives (Raz 1986; Dworkin 1993; McClain 1998). Her
insistence on respecting a pregnant woman's choice whether or not to nurture her fetus resonates with liberal and feminist arguments that women
have the right and responsibility to decide this matter conscientiously for
themselves, as well as the meaning of motherhood and what role it will play
in their lives (Allen 1988; Richards 1986), and that compelled nurture of a
fetus and motherhood harm women and conscript them into a role that
they do not choose, even if society deems it a "natural" one for them (Law
1984; Tribe 1988, 1358; Tribe 1990, 104; Rubenfeld 1989; Siegel 1992).
These types of argument pervade pro-choice legal arguments, including the
"voices of women" briefs that West praises, 10 and, indeed, the Supreme
10. The "voices of women" briefs are the amicus brief of the National Abortion Rights
League (NARAL), in Thornburgh v. American CoUege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 474
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Court's most recent statement concerning the justification for the right to
abortion (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 [1992]).
West's "integrated" argument for reproductive freedom shares with familiar liberal and feminist arguments an appeal to a limiting principle about
freedom to choose to nurture or not. It also has distinctive features that
warrant discussion, some of which may make it less persuasive than these
arguments. At the outset, as a relational feminist argument, it is noteworthy
for its affirmation of the moral value of choice: it affords a woman, in her
moral reasoning about pregnancy, an entitlement to decide for herself about
the demands of care and her responsibilities to self, fetus, and others. This
account of relational feminism does not reject liberal autonomy as too atomistic or masculine, but requires it to defend abortion rights and to avoid
the equation of care with self-sacrifice (which West condemns as a
gendered harm) (McClain 1992; Karlan and Ortiz 1993).11 It would seem to
repudiate an argument (against abortion) that principles of relational feminism, such as the centrality of connection and care in women's lives that
West herself identifies (West 1988), require rejection of a worldview that
gives a pregnant woman the power to refuse a connection to a fetus or that
makes the value of the fetus dependent on whether the pregnant woman
wants it or not (Callahan 1986; McClain 1994).12
"Voluntariness" in the formation of nurturant relationships (as a component of positive liberty) is crucial to West's argument in a number of ways
but necessitates forms of governmental responsibility likely to be more or
less controversial. By contending that voluntary nurturant practices (i.e.,
voluntarily assuming the burdens of parenthood) are vital to society, West
can underwrite an argument for collective responsibility to create the material and social preconditions for successful nurturant practices: to help persons who choose to be parents, government can and should do more to
foster reproductive freedom than merely to leave them alone. West suggests
that women and girls require substantial state action to protect them against
injurious pregnancies, "whether coerced, uncoerced but unwanted, or
wanted but harmful" (pp. 142-43). A coerced pregnancy clearly offends the
moral principle of a woman voluntarily undertaking pregnancy. Thus, West
properly mandates a governmental obligation to protect women's sexual auU.S. 809 (1986), and the amicus brief of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and
NARAL in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
11. West often relies on Carol Gilligan's study of a group of women's decision making
about how to resolve a pregnancy (p. 297; 1990b, 83). Gilligan identified in women's moral
reasoning about abortion a stage of allowing themselves to think not only about others but
also about their responsibility to self (as it were, to include themselves in the circle of care)
(Gilligan 1982).
12. This is the argument advanced by Feminists for Life of America. In their amicus
brief in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993), they invoke West's
article, "Jurisprudence and Gender" (1988). They take the view that women may take steps to
avoid becoming pregnant, but if pregnancy ensues, pregnancy and motherhood are natural
parts of women's lives that should be accepted (McClain 1994).
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tonomy and bodily integrity (e.g., vigorous protection against rape and sexual assault). But the rest of West's formulation also assumes that much
heterosexual sex is not voluntary in any meaningful sense of the word, not
only due to outright sexual assault but also to women becoming "giving
selves" who engage in consensual but unwanted sexual activity (discussed
below in part II). This calls for a governmental role in reshaping social
norms and gender ideology about male sexual entitlement and the meaning
of womanhood.
Further, West's reference to protection against "wanted but harmful"
pregnancies makes clear that her brand of relational feminism incorporates
radical feminist (and liberal) concerns about the distorting effects of unjust
background conditions (such as sex inequality and poverty) on women's
desires and choices. This leads to an interesting tension: notwithstanding
West's account of women's biological and moral imperative toward connection and nurture, she also takes a critical stance toward such connection
when, from her hedonic perspective, it is not good for women, even if
women want it. She gives the specific, familiar example of adolescent females who, facing the constraints of poverty and a limited sense of possibilities, regard early motherhood as their best option (p. 142). I agree with
West that, here, "the state needs to be more, not less, involved in the work
of providing women with the education and training for a public life of
responsible civic engagement and for remunerative, fulfilling work" (p. 143;
McClain 1996). However, given the highly contested and controversial issues raised by young women's reproductive choices, surely a hedonic analysis
should take great care to understand the meaning of pregnancy and motherhood in such girls' and women's lives (Ludtke 1997; Luker 1996) and to
attend to the possible problems with such a state-sponsored program of protecting adolescent females and women against "wanted but harmful"
pregnancies. 13
To recap, West's care-based argument seeks to hold fast both to (1) a
principle of society's collective responsibility to pregnant women and for
the nurture, of new life and (2) the "moral mandate of nurturance" implied
by the ethic of care. I am skeptical about whether her argument will prove
more persuasive than either the consistency argument or an argument that
accepts some morally and legally significant distinction between prenatal
life and born persons-a distinction undergirding the inclusion of abortion
rights, as among the cluster of significant personal decisions protected by due
process liberty (Dworkin 1993) but rejected by West elsewhere as "nominal
and question-begging" (West 1990b, 83).

13. West simply mentions this governmental program without elaboration. Perhaps the
context in which the. topic of adolescent pregnancy receives the most attention and study is
the debate over welfare reform (McClain 1996).
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One likely criticism of West's demand for collective responsibility is
that she apparently rejects any idea that a woman's responsibility to the
fetus and to the community requires her to accept the burden of nurture.
Many opponents of legal abortion assert that an unborn life has the moral
and constitutional status of a person (i.e., a right to life) and would reject
West's normative principle that a woman, once pregnant, should decide for
herself whether to continue a nurturant relationship with her fetus. On this
view, the only proper way to acknowledge (as West puts it) "the yalue and
interests" of prenatal life is to preserve such life (Callahan and Callahan
1984). Similarly, some communitarians argue for mutual responsibility: if
society is willing to take on burdens to help pregnant women and mothers
meet their nurturant obligations, then society may reasonably expect
women to continue their pregnancies, except in certain circumstances of
hardship (Glendon 1987; Glendon 1991).14 Here the Samaritan argument
can offer a rejoinder: at present, society does not recognize the right of born
persons to take the bodies of other persons (even children of their parents)
in a manner comparable to the way that a fetus appropriates a woman's body
for its growth and survival. Unless and until society does so, it affords fetuses greater protection than born persons, at pregnant women's expense
(McDonagh 1996). But can West provide a rejoinder?
Another possible criticism of West's care-based argument for abortion
rights is that she has left the unborn out of the circle of care. For example,
West suggests that "the right . . . to reproductive freedom . . . might be
better understood as a constitutional embodiment of our expanded capacity
for caring" about the quality of the lives of those outside our immediate
circle of care, as measured by our willingness to accord women positive liberty (pp. 90-91). She argues: "Constitutional arguments and judicial decisions which directly aim to improve the quality of life of those who are most
endangered, and which do so, in essence, because an ethic of care demands
it, are stronger arguments-and more just-because of it" (p. 91). But many
opponents of legal abortion argue that it is precisely a lack of empathy with
and the inability to view prenatal life as within the human community that
undergirds abortion rights (Noonan 1984); surely a fetus threatened by extinction, they might argue, is among the "most endangered" and most in
need of societal protection of its "quality" of life (indeed, life itself) through
preventing abortion (Glendon 1987). Without either an anti-Samaritan
principle or some distinction between our moral and legal obligations to
prenatal life and born human beings, why should society limit its empathy
for unborn life because of a woman's determination that she, for whatever
reason, cannot or does not wish to assume a nurturant, caring relationship
14. Glendon explores European laws that, on her interpretation, seek to balance
women's right to self-determination (or free development of their personality) with the rights
of unborn life (Glendon 1987, 1991).
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with her fetus? West's care-based argument contemplates that taking into
account "the interest and value of the fetus" is compatible with a woman
terminating her pregnancy, but there is a plausible relational argument that
the moral accounting required by the "moral mandate" of care, given the
fact of connection, is that society should value the fetus by doing whatever
possible to preserve prenatal life, including prohibiting abortion (Callahan
and Callahan 1984).

15

In the end, West implicitly relies strongly on an anticompulsion principle: even if forced nurture makes a fetus's life go better by allowing it to
develop and become a child, such nurture imposes unique and serious bodily
imposition and pain and suffering upon a woman (Casey, 505 U.S. 833
[19921; Colb 1992) The practical problem is that even if society would like
to "rescue" or "save" the fetus, the pregnant woman is the only one, prior to
viability (at least in the current state of technology), who can provide the
sustenance and physical support system that the fetus needs for survival
(Law 1984, 1027). Given that West believes that involuntary nurture is
unjust, her rejection of the Samaritan argument is puzzling. Pregnancy is a
unique form of connection; surely forced nurture by a pregnant woman is a
gender-specific harm. By pointing out that prohibition of abortion singles
out only women for such forced nurture, the anti-Samaritan argument
points out the injustice of this gendered harm (McDonagh 1996). West
finds the anti-Samaritan argument morally unattractive because it fails to
engage questions of moral responsibility, just as an abiding theme in her
critique of pro-choice argument is its seeming embrace of legal rights without any attention to the substantive morality of the protected choice (West
1990b). 1 6 Instead, she seeks to treat the moral quality of a woman's decision
to have an abortion as a shield against a "pro-life" imperative. But, given
the persisting level of disagreement about the morality of abortion and the
parameters of reproductive responsibility, I suspect that the rhetoric of the
"choosing, caring self"-particularly if not linked to an anti-Samaritan argument or a fetus-person distinction-may not afford such protection (McClain 1992).
Notwithstanding the vulnerabilities of West's care-based argument for
abortion rights (and of some similar feminist deployments of the rhetoric of
responsibility and motherhood), I believe it has a valuable core: women's
moral reasoning about abortion is attentive to their conviction about their
15. Relational feminist scholar Ruth Colker suggests that a call for expanded empathy
should lead society to find ways both to grant a woman's right no longer to be pregnant and
(as technology permits) to preserve the fetus's life. She argues that if we break abortion into
two components, a woman's right to be free from the burdens of pregnancy and the death of a
fetus, a woman does not have a right to the latter (Colker 1992). Or perhaps balancing society's responsibility to woman and fetus should lead to advocating adoption instead of abortion, which would at least relieve women of the burdens of involuntary motherhood.
16. I have benefitted here from conversation with Professor West about this point.
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own inability or unwillingness, due to whatever circumstances (including
existing nurturant obligations), to nurture the fetus and accept the responsibility of mothering the child who would otherwise develop (Goldstein
1988; Hanigsberg 1995; Williams 1991).'7 If we want a social world in
which there are truly caring, nurturant practices, then we must recognize a
principle (to put it in liberal terms) of decisional sovereignty that allows
women to decide for themselves whether or not to bear children, and we
must establish the material and social preconditions (to add a feminist spin)
to foster responsible reproductive choice and nurturant relationships.

II.

WEST'S CONCEPTION OF GENDERED HARMS
AND HER CALL FOR AN INSTRUMENTALIST
JURISPRUDENCE

In Caring for Justice, West provides an elaborate account of why and
how women become "giving selves" rather than liberal, autonomous selves.
She contends that women suffer four distinct categories of gender-specific
injuries that have no correlates whatsoever in men's lives, or that men suffer far less frequently than women. These are physical, emotional, psychic,
and political harms:
physically, women suffer harms of invasion not suffered by men; emotionally, women suffer greater harms of separation and isolation than do
men; psychically, women suffer distinctive harms to their subjectivity,
or sense and reality of selfhood that have no correlate in men's lives;
and politically, women suffer distinctive harms of patriarchal subjection
that again have no correlate in men's lives. (p. 100)
West alleges that these harms are "endured by many women throughout the
course of a lifetime, and endured by most women in our culture at some
point in their childhood or adulthood" (p. 109).
The feminist project of writing about women as women is indispensable, given feminism's central commitment to eradicating the subordination
17. Nonetheless, to the extent that this rhetorical strategy seeks to describe abortion as
the caring decision of a responsible mother, it is jarring because it seems to evade an important point: a pregnant woman who aborts her fetus is not doing the same thing as a mother
who nurtures her child. But some abortion decisions and even infanticide decisions may stem
from a woman's desire to protect the would-be child or child from a horrible fate. I am thinking of infanticides practiced by enslaved women, depicted, for example, in Toni Morrison's
novel, Beloved. To the extent that West's argument would support a right to avoid involuntary motherhood and not simply the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, it is in tension with
current constitutional law that affords would-be fathers no right that a woman terminate her
pregnancy and no right to be legally free of responsibility (at least financially) for.a child
whom such fathers do not wish to nurture (Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 482 U.S. 52
[1976]; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 [1992]).
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of women. Yet a basic tenet of anti-essentialism is that, given the complexity of women's experiences and the many variable or salient differences
among women, claims about women should be provisional, contextual, and
qualified (Harris 1990; Bartlett 1990). Feminists often are leery of the
"grand theory" typical of mainstream legal (masculinist) thought and fault
abstract, categorical analyses that seem ungrounded in the practical realities
of women's lives (Fineman 1990).18 But West is an unabashed grand theorist whose subject matter is the interpretation of women's lives, their
pleasures, pains, and motivations, and how law and culture shape those
lives. As noted above, she offers a conception of harms suffered repeatedly
by "many women," and at some point by "most women" (p. 109); she hypothesizes that fear motivates "a great deal more ... apparent altruism than
might appear" and that these apparently altruistic acts are "many times and
in many ways" in reality gendered harms (pp. 110-11, 114). Yet West often
does not appear to be making empirical claims, grounded in statistics or
social science, so much as impressionistic or interpretive ones. Moreover,
there is no obvious way to prove or disprove West's theory of the giving self
by appealing to women's accounts of their own experiences, for the crux of
her argument is that, to survive in a patriarchal world, women remake
themselves so that they desire to please men.1 9
I believe that a feminist reform agenda would likely be more successful
with a more contextual approach to sexuality and marriage than West offers. Her grand theory serves a useful purpose when it paints with a broad
brush, but a finer stroke better serves the task of articulating a reform
agenda. 0 I will sketch the parameters of an alternative account that pays
greater attention to differences among women, to the possibility of reconstructing marriage along feminist lines, to women's resistance to subordination, and to their ability to act amidst social construction and constraint.
Central to my account is the liberal idea of revisability, that is, that persons
can assess and revise their conceptions of the good, including their connections to others, and exit from connections that are oppressive (Kymlicka
1989; Rosenblum 1989). I find valuable resonances between, on the one
hand, the liberal idea of revisability and, on the other, the idea, prominent
18. I would characterize MacKinnon as another grand theorist whose subject matter is
the reality of sex inequality in women's lives. One difference between West and MacKinnon
is that the latter's work typically includes explicitly empirical claims about the manifestation
of sex inequality, that is, paragraphs of statistics about the prevalence of assault within marriage, sexual harassment in the work place, and the like (MacKinnon 1991). West tends to
illustrate her phenomenological claims with women's reports of their experiences (e.g., in
"Jurisprudence and Gender" [1988], she uses some statements by pregnant women made in
amicus briefs to capture certain feelings about pregnancy).
19. Thus, like MacKinnon, West must consider suspect women's reports of their own
desire or pleasure under patriarchy (MacKinnon 1987, 46).
20. Categorical claims about women's lives will resonate with some readers at the same
time that they fail to persuade, and even alienate, other readers who fail to see their own or
many women's experiences reflected in such categorizations (Abrams 1990).
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in the work of some feminist scholars of color, of the interplay between
oppression and resistance (Harris 1990; Collins 1991) and the postmodern
idea that the self shapes even as it is shaped by social construction (Hirschmann 1996; Butler 1990).21 I shall contend, once again, that the basic
model of the self against which West assesses gendered harms is liberal, and
that this model may prove to be too liberal in its quest for a self who acts
free from outside influences. Acknowledging more directly her reliance on
liberalism and enlisting certain elements of anti-essentialism and
postmodemism as her allies would help to advance the reform agenda that
West's instrumentalist feminism invites. It also would help to relieve some
of the internal tension within Caring for Justice over the respective roles of
law and culture in legitimating and perpetuating gendered harms and how
best to remedy such harms.

A.

The Liberal Self versus the Giving Self: West's Hedonic
Feminism

In Caring for Justice, West theorizes about how women become giving
selves, labeling such self-constitution a gender-based harm. As with her integration of care and justice, here too it is the liberal self that serves as the
standpoint of critique. West claims that the harm stems from the severing of
hedonic connections; that is, a giving self lacks the capacity for robust, autonomous individualism, measured by "positing, asserting, thrusting herself
into the world" (p. 103). In contrast, she says, such connection, or the capacity for self-possession and self-direction, is central to the liberal (or as
she sometimes puts it, the economic-liberal) self. I take her basic point
about this hedonic connection to be compatible with the liberal idea of a
capacity to form, act on, and revise a conception of the good. The invasive
harm of unwanted pregnancy (as we saw in part I), for example, "severs the
moral connections of will, choice, and moral act which are central to ethical liberalism" (p. 106). Another source of invasive injury, assaultive sex
("whether rape, incest, sexual abuse, or harassment") causes "the distinctive
gendered harm" of "the spiritual murder of the economic-liberal hedonic
21. Of course, I realize that postmodernist and poststructuralist feminists may resist the
term autonomy on the ground that agency or partial agency is what is realistic given the fact of
social construction (Higgins 1997). I believe that the distinction between agency and autonomy is not as great as some postmodernist feminists maintain. But postmodern feminists and a
range of other anti-essentialist feminists pose important challenges both to liberal and relational models of the self that seem to assume a unitary or essential self. I believe that such
liberal notions as revisability and liberalism's acknowledgment of the formative role of culture
and civil society shows important common ground between liberalism and feminism.
Postmodemist feminists helpfully argue that, although everyone participates in social construction, some have more resources and fewer constraints than others and that fostering
freedom for all members of society may require taking such differences into account (Hirschmann 1996).
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self'; that is, "one's own pleasures-and one's entitlement to act on themare frozen and obliterated" (p. 105).22 A woman faced with repeated assault
may-to preserve herself-redefine herself to desire the pleasure of the
feared other: this leads to the death of liberal subjectivity, for "there can be
no sense of self-possession when the self has been invaded by the desires,
pleasure, will, and actions of another, and stronger, and life-threatening,
human being" (p. 104).
West uses the liberal hedonic self to diagnose and indict gender-based
injury in women's lives, even though her own position with respect to this
liberal self is complex. At times her portrayal suggests that the obvious discrepancy between women's experiences and this liberal self makes the latter
an easy target of derision and humor. For example, she contends that the
liberal model of self is evident in hundreds of Cathy cartoons and similarly
links it to the "ejaculatory, self-imposing, world-conquering" self celebrated
in the work of controversialist-feminist Camille Paglia (pp. 107-9; Paglia
1990). West observes: "Whether this liberal self is something to fear, abhor,
laugh at, or admire, it seems to be a conception of self that, at least in this
culture, is more foreign to women than to men" (p. 108). Is her point that
women simply cannot be liberal selves and should not aim to be?
Caringfor Justice neither concludes that liberal selfhood is an unrealistic ideal nor offers a fundamentally different, relational, model against
which to assess gendered injury. To the contrary, West's indictment of the
giving self is best understood as a claim that law and legal theory should
work to close the gap between a deeply rooted liberal normative ideal of
selfhood and the reality of many, or most, women's lives. Here is the problem West poses: women's capacity for connection-rooted in biology as
well as gender socialization-leaves them vulnerable to various invasive
harms and other injuries stemming from connection. Patriarchy, reflected in
law and culture, legitimates some of the invasions that women suffer. The
combination of biology, women's moral inclinations, and patriarchal legitimation causes many (or most) women to become giving selves (pp. 108-9).
There is a gap between women's lives and the liberal ideal of responsible
self-government: "agiving self lacks autonomy; indeed, the condition is antithetical to autonomy" (p. 121). The solution is to help women realize this
ideal. Indeed, West calls for an instrumentalist feminism that seeks to end
this disassociation between will and action in women's lives and to reclaim
desire, making possible meaningful choice and action not motivated by fear
(pp. 173-74). Put in more liberal terms, the components of such a vision
would include protection of bodily integrity and the personal responsibility

22. Although West suggests that there is no analogy in men's experience to this death of
a liberal and individualist conception of the subject, I wonder about parallels with respect to
such extreme situations as enslavement and torture.
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to decide (and act) free from compulsion (whether by government or by
others in the "private" sphere), in effect, a life that is chosen, not dictated.
West's model of self is, in effect, the choosing, caring self. To be sure,
her theory of the giving self requires critical investigation of the idea of
choice, because unjust background conditions shape, indeed, distort choice.
In this sense, her approach is not merely hedonic, because she does not
simply call for a validation of women's reports of their desires or what gives
them pleasure or pain. Instead, she incorporates liberal and radical feminist
concerns about false consciousness and the impact of oppression on
women's conceptions of the good (Becker 1992; MacKinnon 1987). I shall
illustrate by explicating and critiquing West's portrait of marriage as the site
for women's self-sacrifice and even the obliteration of self.

B.

Scenes from a Marriage: Unmasking Care as Harm

West calls into question many acts of care performed by women as, in
reality, gendered harms because of their origin in gender socialization and
fear of male violence. In her elaboration of the concept of harm, she claims
that fear accounts for many more of such acts than may initially be apparent
(pp. 114, 117). She highlights two basic forms of altruism that are, in reality, gendered harms: sexual altruism and domestic altruism.
West's portrait of the role of fear in women's lives begins with provocative phenomenological claims concerning women's existential vulnerability:
"Women's bodies, whether by nature or training, are smaller and weaker
than men's, and, also unlike men's, can be vaginally penetrated in a way
which gives some men sexual pleasure" (p. 100). She argues that this physical differential, coupled with women's capacity to be impregnated, leads to
sexual assault and unwanted pregnancy as "central and even defining harmful experiences for women in ways that have no correlate" for men (p. 101).
In view of their existential vulnerability, "many women enter into and
then remain in long-term heterosexual relations with a man for whom they
may feel very little, and from whom they obtain precious little that could
conceivably be called 'pleasure,' for the straightforward but rarely acknowledged reason that such a relationship, and such a man, can protect her
against the threat of violent sexual assault from other men" (p. 115). (This
is similar to the "protection racket" view of marriage advanced by some
feminists.) Why? Young girls learn, as they mature, that their sexuality,
which should be "a source of pleasure and identity," is instead, or also, a
source of danger, a danger that may be lethal (p. 114). Men want access to
women's bodies for sexual gratification, and, so long as "some men will use
force to 'take' [a woman's] sexuality from her," and the state does not successfully deter such acts, "a woman's sexuality puts her in serious harm's
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way" (p. 114). Further, young girls are also socialized to believe that women
should be sexually available to and please men (pp. 135-37).
Although my analysis will concentrate on West's account of marriage,
this motivational portrait merits attention, for it suggests some of the pitfalls
of her essentialist appeal to the body as a determinant of sex inequality and
gendered harm. Her curiously passive and deterministic account of women's
anatomy and physical capacity already treats heterosexual sex as sought after by men, because it is pleasurable for them, and not obviously wanted or
pleasurable for women. Its focus upon male-female penetration also unwittingly establishes heterosexuality (and intercourse) as the privileged sexual
norm by ignoring both the phenomenon of men's penetration of other
men's bodies as a source of sexual pleasure (as well as, when nonconsensual,
harm) (Bersani 1988; Rideau 1992) and the role of penetration in lesbian
sexual practices (Goldstein 1998). It also suggests, from the outset, female
vulnerability to men and men as a source of danger to women. By setting up
a male-aggressor-female-victim dyad rooted in the female body itself, West
misses and marginalizes the not infrequent phenomenon of physical and
sexual abuse of boys and the psychic harms stemming from such abuse. Here
a liberal feminist account would differ from West's hedonic account by being more wary about claims rooted in physical difference that overlook variation among women, as well as commonality between women and men, and
that appeal to women's limited capacities or special vulnerabilities (Williams 1982).23
As West describes it, marriage, for women, involves the painful separation from their mothers and families, and from the world of pleasant female
friendships (p. 130).24 Wives find themselves in emotionally "cold" marriages with spouses who often use them as emotional and even physical
punching bags and who expect sexual gratification and domestic labor (pp.
119-20, 130-31). In such marriages, women transform themselves into
"giving selves," whereby they reconstitute themselves as persons who desire
to please men. They engage in sexual altruism, whereby they have sexual
relations that are consensual but not pleasurable. Women give up the rela23. West, for example, describes pregnancy in a way that maximizes the gap between the
liberal self and a pregnant woman. She suggests that the experience has little to do with
reason, will, or duty, and more to do with instinctual emotion and passivity (Ip.108). This
seems to ignore the myriad decisions and actions that pregnant women undertake concerning
their pregnancies. Although hardly scientific, my own experience and knowledge of other
women's experiences suggest that pregnancy is a complex mix of a sense of acting and of being
acted upon, and that women vary widely in their experience of agency in pregnancy.
24. The famous short story, "A Jury of Her Peers"-in which two farm wives reconstruct
how a lonely and isolating marriage (and the immediate spur of a husband's killing of a wife's
parakeet) led to a wife's murder of her husband-is a frequent example that West invokes for
the emotional harms resulting from, and the "lethal consequences" of, a cold marriage (p.
131 ). West devotes a later chapter of her book to discussing this short story by Susan Glaspell
(pp. 218-58). This brings to mind Carroll Smith-Rosenberg's famous study of friendships
among nineteenth-century women (Smith-Rosenberg 1975).
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tionship between their own sexuality and pleasure for the sake of safety, a
"simple bargain" made to break the lethal connection between one's own
sexuality and "life-threatening danger," but one which requires a fundamental "redefinition of self' (p. 116).
Women also engage in domestic altruism, or the "nursemaid ethos"
that they must subordinate their own needs to those of husbands and children (p. 117).25 Here West's empirical point of departure is Arlie
Hocshchild's famous study of the "second shift," that is, the vast majority of
child care and domestic labor that wives do, even when they are also participating in the paid labor force (p. 111; Hochschild 1989). While this work
documents, as West describes them, "objective" harms to women, such as
less leisure time and financial consequences, she sets out to show other
types of harm caused by domestic altruism. Why, as an initial matter, do
women engage in such altruism? Women engage in mothering out of a felt
necessity rooted, West believes, in the biological facts of pregnancy and
lactation themselves but also solidified through cultural norms about mothering. Mothering creates dependence, because persons who take on obligations for others are less autonomous and depend on others for economic
support (pp. 117-20; Fineman 1995). Because of this dependency, a wife
rightly fears that her husband may disappear at any point; she transforms
herself into one who does tasks cheerfully and does not experience her altruistic acts as driven by fear and insecurity (p. 119).
With respect both to sexual altruism and to domestic altruism, there is
a severing of the connection (central to liberalism) between pleasures, felt
desire, choices, and actions (p. 119). "Female sexuality" is not emblematic
of liberal selfhood, but destroys it, to the degree that it is constituted by
altruistic acts driven by fear. And acts of domestic altruism are not acts
stemming from a "robust morality of care." Rather, this triad of inequality,
fear, and nurturance is the foundation of a "neurotic nursemaid mentality"
and acts that are self-abasing or "simply reflexively masochistic" (pp.
120-21). They stem not from a moral sensibility but a battered sense of self.
For the same reason, West discounts the significance of women's "consent"
and suggests that economic theory and liberal legalism, by assuming that
women "consent" to marriage and to the second shift, fail to register the
gender-based harms linked to women's acts of altruism as harms (pp.
112-13).
Law, West further contends, plays a role in turning women into giving
selves within marriage by failing to recognize such gendered harms as intimate violence and the second shift. When law fails to recognize such invasive harms as domestic violence and marital rape, it leaves women subject to
a "separate sovereignty" in the private sphere. West theorizes that women
adjust their self-concept, behavior, and expectations, as though in a master25. West takes this formulation from Camille Paglia (p. 117).
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slave relationship (pp. 143-45). "If the message is internalized that one's
subjective well being is not valued, then subjectivity itself disappears" (p.
146). And "a woman who nursemaids through marriage.., is viewed by her
husband, the state, and eventually herself as not having needs worth recognizing, or interests worth attending to" (p. 150). When courts and legislatures fail to recognize and protect against such harms within marriage, they
reinforce and mandate unjust relationships and are thus complicit in them.

C.

Can (and Should) Marriage Be Saved?: A Critique of
West's Phenomenology of the Giving Self

West's impressionistic and provocative portrait of women's altruistic
behavior within marriage as a gender-based harm deserves praise for capturing some important truths about traditional marriage, as an institution, and
how that institution shapes the behavior of its participants. Even though
West does not rely on such literature, sociological studies of marriage certainly would lend some support to her account (Bernard 1982). For example, an extensive comparative study of thousands of married, cohabiting,
and same-sex couples found that marriage is in a state of transformation, but
that the model of traditional marriage continued to influence how married
couples organized their lives (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983). Traditional
marriage relies upon a male-provider-female-homemaker dyad. Consequences flowing from that basic division of labor include a presumption of
male entitlement to be the leader, or head, of the household and to be free
from any significant household or child care responsibilities, and female
"entitlement" to be primarily responsible for domestic labor and child care
(and, if economically feasible, to stay out of the full-time paid labor force).
Even if traditional couples describe these roles as equal, the power dynamics
within the relationship suggest that the provider role carries with it more
respect and more power and the homemaker role is seen as of less value
(Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; Schwartz 1994). Similarly, traditional marriage rests on a basic sexual dynamic of male initiation and female refusal or
consent; a woman's actual ability to refuse as well to have her partner respect her sexual wishes depends upon her power within the relationship
(Blumstein and Schwartz 1983). In sum, it seems a reasonable inference
that traditional marriage rests on a gendered division of rights and responsibilities that encourages women's self-sacrifice in the forms of domestic and
sexual altruism. Indeed, at the conclusion of her influential study detailing
the costs of marriage for women, Jessica Bernard identified as the first order
of business so far as the future of marriage is concerned to be that of mitigating its hazards for women, that is, to "upgrade" marriage for women through
"more sharing of roles by both partners" (Bernard 1982, 247, 289).
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It is undeniable, as a historical matter, that the law built a gendered
division of labor of male provider-female homemaker into the marriage
contract. It also failed to afford wives protection against most physical assault and rape by their husbands. In this way, law is, indeed, complicit in
legitimating gendered injuries. Feminists across the spectrum, including liberal feminists, have condemned the institution of marriage because of its
failure to protect women's bodily integrity and sexual autonomy by affording men rights at women's expense and have critiqued understandings of
privacy that have contributed to married women's isolation, confinement,
and sacrifice of self (Allen 1988). They have also criticized the provider/
caretaker dyad for its imposition of unjust burdens on women.
But marriage is also an institution in the midst of transformation, just
as traditional gender roles within marriage and the larger society are the
subject of contestation and reconstruction. One limitation of West's analysis is that it lacks a temporal dimension. Offering little empirical support,
she makes some very strong assumptions about the impact of law on consciousness and how women read its messages, suggesting that law and culture exert an almost crushing force on women's sense of self. She does not
look with adequate precision at the respective roles of law and culture in
perpetuating gendered harm within marriage, not does she take into account the phenomenon of women's protest against the injustice of the traditional marriage contract and how such protest has brought about change.
An adequate feminist analysis of marriage, particularly one motivated by a
desire for legal reform, should begin with asking what role, if any, law plays
in perpetuating or even requiring inequality and injustice as part of the marriage contract.
There is an unresolved internal tension within West's analysis about
the respective importance of law and culture, which oscillates between admitting little difference between legal coverture (under which a wife had no
legally recognized separate existence) and contemporary marriage, and minimizing the role of law by suggesting that today it is largely culture that
legitimates gendered harms. West no doubt has a point about the message
law sends concerning the appropriateness of traditional gender roles to the
extent that marriage law continues to enforce the old contract of a husband
providing material support in exchange for a wife providing domestic services. But contemporary family law allows considerable latitude for married
couples to shape the marital relationship to their own purposes, and marriage itself dictates to a significantly lesser degree than in the past the
gendered division of labor within the household. And even with respect to
the marital rape exemption, one of West's most frequent examples of how
law permits gender-based injury and transforms women into giving selves, a
feminist analysis should acknowledge that some progress has been made: "no
state now has a complete marital exemption for criminal sexual offense. In
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all states, forcible rape of a wife, even when the couple is still living together, is a criminal act in at least some circumstances" (National Center
on Women and Family Law, Inc. 1996).
It is true that further legal reform is necessary, since various forms of
exemptions still persist in some states, but it seems likely that the law sends
a different message about male and female sexual entitlement than it did
when it afforded no protection whatsoever against marital rape. Indeed, the
perceived inadequacy of state law in this area was one impetus for the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Yet West does not consider the
evolution of state and federal law such as the Violence Against Women Act
to recognize violknce against women within the home as a crime and (when
motivated by gender) a civil rights violation, or the impact that such legal
change may have on women's and men's consciousness about entitlement
within marriage. Of course, it is necessary to address the problem that the
scope and efficacy of such legal reform may be blunted by lingering ideology
about gender and family privacy (Goldfarb 1998; Siegel 1996). Moreover,
even if law no longer legitimates inequality within. marriage, the culture,
gender ideology, and market forces (to name a few) are potent determinants
of women and men's behavior within marriage.
For these reasons, West's focus upon culture as a potent force is important. Her categorical claims about women ring true in the sense that sexism,
gender ideology, and sexual inequality are collective phenomenon and serve
to create a commonality within the category "woman." But these phenomena operate on an individual basis and affect different women differently,
leading different women to behave'differently. Her account certainly gets
something right in suggesting a constitutive role played by fear in women's
lives; it is undeniable that sexual violence continues to pose a serious problem to women's well-being and ability to act as sexual subjects. 26 For example, a woman may vigorously deny that she chose marriage for male
protection, but may readily admit that, as a way to cope with her fear of
sexual assault, she feels safer walking down the street at night with a man
than alone.
Yet West's claims that young girls and women take the further step of
managing that fear by becoming giving selves are too general and unqualified. Undoubtedly, the knowledge that rape exists in our society shapes
young women's sexuality in some way; but West does not demonstrate that
such knowledge so compromises all or even most young women's sense of
sexual subjectivity that they cease even to think of their own pleasure or of
themselves as sexual subjects, not simply qbjects, and become giving selves.
What is missing in West's account of sexuality is the dialectic, spoken of in
earlier feminist work on women's quest for sexual liberation, between plea26. In this instance West does rely upon social science work, that concerning the prevalence of women's fear of rape (pp. 100-101).
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sure and danger: that is, the insight that sexual pleasure is an important
component of women's liberation and self-determination, but that negotiating sexual pleasure can be a source of danger, not only because of the reality
of men's sexual violence but also because of norms and stereotypes denying
that "good" women should or can enjoy sex (Meyer. 1994; Snitow, Stansell,
and Thompson 1983; Vance 1992).
A central theme in West's work is bringing women's narratives into
the open to gain a better understanding of their hedonic lives (West 1987,
1988). Yet her account of women's sense of terror, and the severing of will
and desire from act, seems out of touch with contemporary culture, in which
heterosexual women and lesbians use such media as art, literature, music,
and film to express a rich range of ideas and emotions about sexuality.
These range from the seeming embrace of gender ideology of male sexual
entitlement, to active critique of and anger at such ideology, to various
forms of subverting and transforming such ideology (Franke 1993-94;
Meyer 1994).27 Her monolithic account of contemporary culture shaping
women as passive, physically weak, and available for male sexual access has
no room for the enormously popular stars of women's basketball, Xena the
Warrior Princess, musicians such as Ani DiFranco, PJ Harvey, Liz Phair,
Melissa Etheridge, and Queen Latifah, or such films as The Incredible True
Story of Two Girls in Love, Girltown, or even G.I. Jane. When female musicians create hugely successful albums giving voice to emotions ranging from
desire to rage over male sexual abuse, when a major fashion magazine runs a
story on the "lesbian baby boom," and when Essence magazine features writings by prolific African American feminist writer bell hooks, it is clear that
contemporary culture has a more complex relationship to patriarchy than
West's account suggests and that we need a more nuanced theory about how
women shape culture even as they are shaped by it. Similarly, rather than
sweeping claims about fear, a more nuanced analysis of how cultural ideology about gender, romance, and sexuality shape both adolescent females
and males is necessary if feminists are to find ways to empower girls and to
28
alter the cultural ideology of male entitlement and sexual irresponsibility.
27. Indeed, even romance novels, one of West's targets, offer a far richer range of stories
about the possibility of female sexual agency and gender equality than West allows.
28. For example, feminist scholarship on adolescent sexuality suggests that culture, including gender socialization about male sexual entitlement and privilege, exerts an influence
in shaping young men's and women's sexual interactions and in leading young women to focus
on a male partner's desire rather than their own (Fine 1988; Higgins and Tolman 1997).
However, other feminist scholarship details the considerable variation among adolescent girls
with respect to their degree of sexual agency and their ability successfully to negotiate their
way through such matters as intimacy, pleasure, and relationships (Thompson 1995). Variables such as educational level, economic status, ethnic and racial characteristics, and expectations about their future all play a part in the extent to which adolescent girls are able to act
as sexual subjects. For example, one recent study of teenage girls found that the girls who
offered the best examples of sexual and reproductive agency were those who were able to
separate sex and reproduction because of certain goals for future professional achievement and
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Here greater attention to how "outsiders" read and resist mainstream
culture would help the development of a more dialectical account of the
relationship between self and culture. For example, African American feminist scholars argue that because culture offers African American women
such negative images of themselves, they have had to forge their own selfdefinition, and self-conception, and create an oppositional culture in order
to produce self-esteem and pride (Collins 1991).29 Similarly, faced with negative and stereotypical cultural images, lesbians and gay men recognize the
need to engage in cultural production to seek to transform dominant cultural images (Schacter 1997). Although the lack of cultural validation and
homophobic and hateful cultural messages are oppressive and harmful and
may cause some analogue to false consciousness and internalization of negative images, gay men and lesbians do not uniformly accept "culture's"
messages at face value. Some studies suggest that the exclusion from mainstream culture of positive images and models necessitates an especially active sense of agency and the assertive charting of missing paths (Slater 1995,
87, 204). A more nuanced model of the self and of the interplay between
self and culture is necessary to account for the practice of resistance, subversion, and transformation of dominant images.
From her earliest work in feminist jurisprudence, West hinted at the
possibility of a heterosexuality premised on trust, love, and pleasure, rather
than dominance, fear, and pain (West 1987; 1988, 47-48, 57-58). She
evidently all but abandons such a possibility in Caring for Justice. This is
discouraging, for it presupposes a monolithic account of women as victims
instead of a more complex model of the possibility of agency amidst constraint and of the many ways in which heterosexual women can and do
negotiate sexuality and marriage to make them better serve women's wellbeing. Here, especially, West needs to engage more constructively with
anti-essentialism's call for a more provisional and contextual analysis of
women's experience.
As for West's analysis of the internal dynamics of marriage, relational
feminists often appear to essentialize and romanticize motherhood and not
to reckon adequately with other feminist analysis suggesting that women
have great ambivalence about mothering and that it is an experience rich in
gender equality within intimate relationships. They also experienced themselves as subjects
who resisted norms of male domination and decentered romance and kept it from taking over
their sense of self (Thompson 1995, 249). In contrast, many of the teenage girls who became
pregnant and then mothers interpreted their experience within a deeply romantic dream of
fusing true love, first sex, marriage, and motherhood (Thompson 1995, 137). Such stories
generally did not have the happy endings initially hoped for, but more often ended up with
problems of abandonment by the male partner or an early, troubled marriage, and a young
woman sobered by a sense of maternal responsibility and determination to survive.
29. In contrast to the romantic paternalism undergirding separate spheres ideology concerning white women's proper roles, women of color have had more uniformly negative cultural images with which to contend (Roberts 1993).
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pain and pleasure, subordinating as well as empowering (Becker 1992;
Sanger 1992; Rich 1976).30 To West's credit, she does suggest that caretaking itself can be both a virtue and an injury, yet she does not indicate the
parameters of a reconciliatory feminist account of care. Treating women's
mothering as natural and even instinctual, as West at time does, fails both
to credit women for the hard work of mothering and to account for some
women's neglect and abuse of their children (Ruddick 1989). As Martha
Fineman suggests, mothering is a "specific practice of social and emotional
responsibility," and yet motherhood itself is a colonized concept, that is,
ideology about mothering shapes women's experience of mothering
(Fineman 1995, 124-25, 234).
Attention to the work on mothering by feminist scholars of color who
stress will, autonomy, and resistance amidst domination would strengthen
West's analysis (Harris 1990; Collins 1991, 1994). For example, her account
of women's experience in marriage as one of isolation and separation from
the world of maternal and female friendship may aptly characterize the middle-class wives about whom Betty Friedan wrote in the Feminine Mystique,
but it hardly serves as an adequate description for African American
women, who have a long history of forming bonds with each other in kin
networks and using "other mothers" to help care for children (Baber and
Allen 1992).31 Far from isolating them, their maternal role has had close
ties to a broader role of community uplift, preservation, and support (Collins 1991, 1994; Baber and Allen 1992; Stack 1974). As feminist scholar
Patricia Hill Collins suggests, putting the experiences of women of color in
the center of feminist theorizing about motherhood "demonstrates how emphasizing the issue of father as patriarch in a decontextualized nuclear family distorts the experiences of women in alternative family structures with
quite different political economies" (Collins 1994, 46). To be sure, there are
important questions about the extent to which an ethic and practice of care
by such women reflects subordination, specifically racial subordination, and
is a practice adopted out of necessity for cultural and community preservation (Collins 1994; Baber and Allen 1992; Tronto 1993). Similarly, some
scholars have identified the troubling ways in which this imperative constrains women of color who suffer domestic violence (Crenshaw 1991).
The choosing, caring self is an important step toward a feminist account of care. But mothering (and fathering) involve daily and numerous
acts of care, acts that may feel less a matter of choice than one of the imperative to respond to a child's needs. Does consent to be a parent, or choice,
render all subsequent acts of caregiving "voluntary" and hence un30. 1thank Carlin Meyer for bringing up this point about motherhood and ambivalence.
31. Recent feminist attention to women's intimate bonds with other women suggests
that married women do seek out and maintain female friendships and turn to such friendships
for emotional satisfaction (Baber and Allen 1992).
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problematic, even if self-sacrificing? It would be valuable if West would
press on the question ,of'the extent to which mothering is self-sacrificing
simply because of the nature of children's needs, and the extent to which
such factors as cultural constructions of ideal mothering and the lack of
family-friendly policies in the workplace exacerbate those burdens for
women (and those men who engage in caregiving).32 Also, more attention
to the market and how it encourages couples to perpetuate the providerhomemaker-caregiver dynamic as a "rational" division of labor, even when
both husbands and wives engage in market labor, is necessary (Schwartz
1994).
Relational feminists and their sympathetic critics correctly identify
care as an important value and practice (Tronto 1993). Among the beneficiaries of this scholarship are liberals and liberal feminists, who correctly
call for the identification of care as a vital political issue, worthy of national
attention (Okin 1989). Recently, there is some recognition of a serious
problem of the unmet need for safe, good-quality child care for middle-class
and working-class families and also for women on public assistance who are
subject to workfare requirements but cannot find or afford such care. To
translate feminist concern about care into a reform agenda that might shape
this emerging public debate, however, it is necessary to recognize the dynamics of race and class and how they structure caregiving in our society.
Here West does not go far enough. As Joan Tronto argues, it may be tempting to view caregiving as work disproportionately done by women, but it is
also work disproportionately done by women and men of color and poor
women. The devaluation of caregiving, specifically, maternal labor and the
work of child rearing, translates into comparatively lower (and even poverty-level) wages for paid caregivers (Tronto 1993, 112-14). Many mothers
(often white and more affluent) shift "their" responsibility for such labor by
employing other women (often women of color and poorer), which may also
require those women to leave their own children. An adequate feminist
approach to making child care a political issue needs to be holistic and
intersectional and to work toward safe child care for all and societal valuation of domestic labor.
Another set of concerns with West's analysis relates more to her portrayal of the "down" side of connection-women's connection to men. Her
account of marriage fails to consider the wide range of possible power dynamics within marriage and the extent to which women and men can and
32. For example, West makes the startling claim that a breast-feeding mother cannot
engage in productive activity. This is hardly a universal truth about breast-feeding, since
women in some cultures carry their nursing infants with them as they work. With the advent
of breast pumps and opportunities in the workplace to use them, it is not true that breastfeeding women cannot engage in productive labor. As a sign of the changing times, the New
Yorker recently ran a cover of a female construction worker taking time out to nurse her infant
on the job site.
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do negotiate alternatives to traditional marriage and "upgrade" marriage for
women. It would be valuable to know more about what circumstances facilitate women engaging in such negotiation and what resources foster their
success. Lest I fall victim to my own anti-essentialist critique .of West's analysis of marriage, I should state at the outset that, although I draw upon
empirical research about marriage, I do not purport to offer an exhaustive
account of marriage. Rather, I enlist this research to argue for the need for
greater attention to context and to variation within .marriage than West
provides.
For example, some women may accept certain inequality within the
marital relationship, for example, the second shift, even if they would prefer
a more equitable division of labor, because their alternatives to the marriage
are worse than staying in the marriage; if their husband's alternatives are
better, this results in an inequality in bargaining power (Mahoney 1995;
Wax 1998). 33 A woman's ability to negotiate within marriage, a woman's
level of education, her race, social class, employment choices, upbringing
concerning proper gender roles, and choice of spouse-all these, and
more-will factor into bargaining power within marriage and the type of
marriage that results (Mahoney 1995; Schwartz 1994). Cultural norms and
socialization also play a role: women and men may adopt the providerhomemaker model (even when the woman also works) because they were
brought up that way and it feels right (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983).
Nonetheless, women's work outside of the home helps to equalize power
within marriage and gains them greater respect from their husbands (Blum34
stein and Schwartz 1983, 139).
Casting doubt on West's "giving-self" model is the fact that women
register dissatisfaction with marriage, leave marriages, renegotiate or find
other means of resistance within marriage, find alternative types of relationships, or avoid marriage entirely. Notably, West relies on H6chschild's
book, The Second Shift, as setting out women's disproportionate assumption
of caretaking, but she does not address Hochschild's more recent finding
that some women are seeking to escape that double burden through immersing themselves in their jobs, which come to seem a haven from the home
(Hochschild 1997). Women more often decide to terminate marriage and to
initiate divorce than men (Braver, Whitley, and Ng 1993). Some women
33. Interesting work by feminist and other scholars applies game theory and bargaining
theory to marriage to yield these sorts of conclusions (Mahoney 1995; Wax 1998). In a provocative recent book, Hard Bargains: The Politics of Sex (1998), feminist scholars Linda
Hirshman and Jane Larson apply a bargaining model to power dynamics in heterosexual relationships and argue for state regulation that enhances women's bargaining power.
34. For example, some studies find a more egalitarian model of marriage among working-, middle-, and upper-class African American couples, attributed in part to the fact that
the wife's income is equal to, better than, or more stable than the husband's. Tlis in turn
relates to structural factors concerning African American men's employment opportunities
(Schwartz 1994, 184).
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who divorce go on to form lesbian relationships. A growing number of
women, both young women and older women, decline to marry and instead
choose to pursue motherhood outside of marriage (Fineman 1995; Ludtke
1997). Other women may choose cohabitation as a conscious attempt to
avoid the traditional role division of marriage (Blumstein and Schwartz
1983).
To put these phenomena within a liberal feminist framework, all of
these behaviors suggest greater capacity in women for critically assessing
and revising connections than West contemplates. They also suggest that,
rather than becoming giving selves, women may develop an acute sense of
the injustice and unfairness of current gender relations. The more these
types of options are available and attractive to women, the more space there
would seem to be for resistance of the cultural messages that West claims
induce women into marriage and the role of a giving self. Ample evidence
suggests that marriage, as traditionally constituted, is in many ways not optimal for many women (Bernard 1982). But West's analysis is too monolithic
and fails to look at all the ways women resist injustice within marriage and
also seek to transform marriage more to their liking.
It is an important empirical question whether women, in the face of
injustice and inequality, develop a sense of moral outrage and a demand for
change, or whether (as West suggests) they adapt their preferences so that
their circumstances no longer seem unjust or unequal. There is evidence
that both responses occur. For example, work on the problem of adapting
preferences to background conditions of inequality suggests that women
come to expect less and to accept their unequal treatment (Okin 19 94a,
1994b). At the same time, the history of feminism reveals a pervasive theme
of women subject to gender inequality developing consciousness about the
injustice of unequal treatment and raising demands for gender justice
(Rhode 1989; Lloyd 1995). Certainly, the patriarchal nature of the marital
relationship and male prerogative concerning sex, work, and family life led
to strong agitation by women to eradicate the injustice of the marital con3
tract (Richards 1998, 63-124) .
Marriage is an institution in the midst of transformation. There is continuing evidence that marriage exacts higher costs from women than from
men and brings them less happiness, especially due to the "second shift"
(Fowers 1991, 209). But there is also considerable evidence that, on average, marriage has substantial benefits for women and men and enhances
perceptions of well-being for both (Waite 1995; Mookherjee 1997).36 Con35. In a sense, Elizabeth Cady Stanton as well as Betty Friedan were frustrated housewives whose individual experiences led them to collective action to seek better lives for
women (Richards 1998).
36. Waite concludes: "on average .... marriage seems to produce substantial benefits for
men and women in the form of better health, longer life, more and better sex, greater earnings
(at least for men), greater wealth, and better outcomes for children" (Waite 1995, 499). The
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temporary work on the dynamics of marriage suggests both that cultural
influence of feminist principles of equality has led to women's decreased
tolerance for unrewarding marriages (Braver et al. 1993, 16) and that a major predictor of marital stability is husbands' willingness to accept influence
from and share power with their wives (Gottman et al. 1998). Moreover,
some couples do make considerable change to upgrade marriage for the wife
and achieve egalitarian, or peer, marriage (Schwartz 1984; Vannoy-Hiller
and Philliber 1989; Josselson 1996). Sociologist Pepper Schwartz, in her
study of peer marriage, concludes that "the end of separate spheres means a
considerable advance of intimacy and respect" (Schwartz 1994, 90). Because
persons in such marriages attempt to reconstitute marriage as an equal partnership, without reliance either on the provider-homemaker dyad or on a
model of male initiation-female refusal, Schwartz suggests that we might
regard these women and men as a "vanguard" who model the possibilities
for equality within marriage (Schwartz 1994). Indeed, more recently, she
proposes that peer marriage may offer a valuable model of marriage that may
reduce discontent within and the flight from marriage and better accommodate changing gender roles and economic realities (Schwartz 1998).
West stated in "Jurisprudence and Gender" that feminists need to "understand what it means to mother" and to enjoy sex with men "within aspirational conditions of freedom" (West 1988, 47). Her hedonic project,
then, should show more interest in learning about this "vanguard" and what
sorts of factors lead women and men to seek a peer marriage and what kind
of resources help them to achieve one. For example, women and men who
seek peer marriage often consciously reject the gendered division of labor of
their parents' marriage or of their own prior marriage and seek to avoid
female subservience, isolation, or absorption in child raising (Blaisure and
Allen 1995; Josselson 1996, 212; Schwartz 1994). Women, in particular,
speak in terms of equity and fairness (Schwartz 1994, 154). In such marriages, fear is not generally an apt explanation of what motivates the partners, nor is the giving self a helpful model of a woman's role. Men may
pursue a peer relationship out of love for a partner or for children or out of a
sense of fairness (Schwartz 1994, 160-61). Undeniably, cultural ideology
about gender roles and market pressures influence women's and men's abilities to renegotiate and reconstitute marriage. Achieving an egalitarian marriage requires continuing vigilance and commitment to equality in order to
avoid recourse to rigid gender roles so familiar that they seem "natural"
(Blaisure and Allen 1995; Vannoy 1991). But such vigilance and commitment can make possible feminist marriages, which afford a safe and supportive space for women's (and men's) feminist voices and identity and a
important exception here, true especially for white women, is the negative impact upon
women's participation in the workforce.
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vantage point from which to critique sexism in the "outside" world (Blaisure
and Allen 1995).
Finally, attention to the dynamics in same-sex intimate relationships
would be valuable for what they might illuminate about the force of gender
ideology and the possibility of avoiding gendered harms in intimate relationships. West properly condemns criminal sanctions against same-sex activity and the law's nonrecognition of same-sex marriage, together with the
legal obstacles to parenting by lesbians and gay men, not only as harming
gay men and lesbians, but also as harming women disproportionately by
"punish[ing] realistic alternatives to heterosexuality and marriage." Such
alternatives "might provider greater intimacy and less intrusion than the
dominant heterosexual model" '(p. 162). But she does not examine the experience of lesbians to inquire whether intimate relationships between
women harbor the same or different dynamics as heterosexual marriages.
Generally, lesbian couples did not use a provider-homemaker dyad as a
model for organizing their market and domestic labor and insisted upon reciprocity and mutuality in their sexual relationships (Blumstein and Schwartz
1983, 127-31, 148-51). 3 7 As noted above, although gay men and lesbians
suffer harm, oppression, and the lack of legal and social validation of their
intimate lives, they also, by necessity, exercise agency and moral responsibility in establishing different models of family (Weston 1991; Slater 1995).
As some feminists suggest (and as West concurs), lesbian relationships may
offer a valuable model against which to critique traditional marriage
(Hunter 1991; West 1997). At the same time, some feminist scholars have
pointed to the problem of battering within lesbian relationships as raising
serious interpretive questions about how best to conceptualize intimate violence, that is, whether it is a product of patriarchy or an endemic feature
concerning the exercise of power within intimate relationships (Lobel 1986;
Schneider 1992). Using West's framework, we might ask whether fear of
violence or of abandonment motivates lesbians to engage in sexual or domestic altruism.
It may seem that my dispute with West is over whether the glass is half
empty or half full. If she seems unduly pessimistic, I may seem unduly optimistic, given the persistence of the second shift and the grim reminders of
the fact that the home is not yet a safe place for many women. Indeed, to
the question of whether marriage can or should be saved, I embrace the
feminist position that we should seek to transform marriage into a more
egalitarian, inclusive model (including same-sex marriage), without stigmatizing other family forms (Hunter 1991). West shares the conviction that
we can critique and reconstruct the institution of marriage in light of our
37. Lesbian couples, in contrast to married, cohabiting heterosexual, and gay male
couples, did not link infrequency of sex to dissatisfaction with the relationship (Blumstein and
Schwartz 1983).
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aspirations for justice and equality. In this sense, she is liberal. To be sure,
some feminists question whether such reconstruction is possible or worthwhile (Card 1996; Ettelbrick 1992; Franke 1999). One alternative way to
resolve the tension between the up and down sides of connection that West
finds at the core of women's lives is Fineman's proposal to deemphasize
marriage, and the sexual bond between women and men, by premising the
family upon the mother-child dyad (Fineman 1995). If West's instrumentalist jurisprudence is to make its fullest contribution to these debates, it requires a more contextual and- nuanced account of women's experience
within marriage, a more dialectical account of the interplay among self, culture, and law, and a more rigorous account of the respective roles played by
law and culture in creating and legitimating gendered harms. Broad claims
about women's experience that are inattentive to context, to differences
among women, and to the. possibilities for resistance and transformation
show insufficient respect for women's diversity and moral capacities.

CONCLUSION
I applaud Robin West for the projects she undertakes in Caring for
Justice. In this essay, I have suggested ways her rich book points to the liberal future of relational feminism. Although her grand theory is refreshing
and thought provoking, a program for legal reform requires a finer brush
stroke. I have urged that West's humanistic, instrumentalist jurisprudence
can find allies in core liberal ideas as well as certain key tenets of antiessentialist and postmodern feminism.
Ultimately, West's feminism is liberal in its confidence in the possibility of people's revising their lives and our polity's revising our institutions
through law. To care for justice is to believe in the possibility of reasoning
about our institutions and social practices and criticizing them in light of
our aspirations for justice. This project would seek to enlist government, as
West puts it, to improve the quality of women's lives or, as liberals might
express it, to secure the preconditions for free and equal citizenship.
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